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  The United States Congress and Nuclear War Powers:  
Explaining Legislative Nonfeasance 
 
Scholarly debate over the role of the United States Congress in approving military 
action has focused on the respective war powers granted the executive and legislature 
by the United States Constitution. Although a voluminous literature has examined the 
institutional and partisan politics shaping their exercise, a conspicuous lacuna 
concerns nuclear war powers. Despite periodic but mostly ineffective reassertions of 
congressional prerogatives over war, the decision to employ nuclear weapons has 
been left entirely to presidential discretion since 1945. Explaining this consistent 
refusal by Congress to rein in the ultimate presidential power and exercise co-
responsibility for the most devastating form of war relies less on disputatious 
constitutional grounds than on three arguments about congressional dysfunctionality, 
legislative irresponsibility, and the relative costs of collective action by federal 
lawmakers on perilous national security questions.  
 
Keywords: Congress; US Constitution; nuclear war; war powers; no first-use.  
 
Introduction 
The 115
th
 Congress (2017-19) saw two important expressions of heightened concern over the 
constitutional division over nuclear war powers in the United States. First, on 14 November  
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2017, for the first time in forty-one years, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee held 
hearings to consider possible changes to the president’s authority to launch nuclear weapons. 
Second, Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) and Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA) introduced legislation 
to delimit presidential discretion. HR669/S200, the Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons 
Act of 2017, stated that: ‘Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President may not 
use the Armed Forces of the United States to conduct a first-use nuclear strike unless such 
strike is conducted pursuant to a declaration of war by Congress that expressly authorizes 
such strike’ (Lieu, 2017a). Heralded by non-proliferation advocacy groups as an important 
reassertion of democratic accountability, former US Secretary of Defence, William Perry, 
concurred that ‘a decision that momentous for all of civilization should have the kinds of 
checks and balances on Executive powers called for by our Constitution’ (Lieu, 2017b).  
Although it has been claimed that a ‘nuclear taboo’ (Tannenwald, 2007) or ‘tradition’ 
(Paul, 2009), rather than their utility in deterrence (Mandelbaum, 1981), explains the non-use 
of nuclear weapons since 1945, some lawmakers have come to regard executive restraint as 
insufficient. The 115
th
 Congress activity was a clear response to a poly-nuclear order, 
increasing great power competition and, above all, the bellicose rhetoric of President Donald 
J. Trump.  
Three aspects of the revived interest in nuclear matters were nonetheless striking. 
First, though co-sponsored by 51 Democrats in the House of Representatives and nine 
Democrats in the Senate, once referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, no further 
action took place. Nor did the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommend any changes 
to existing nuclear launch arrangements. Second, the Markey-Lieu bill’s restrictive 
credentials were qualified. Its three pages made no effort to limit the president’s capacity to 
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wage defensive nuclear war, in response to an attack. Third, the legislation did not prohibit 
‘first-use’ of nuclear weapons – pre-emptive, in the face of imminent threat, or preventive, in 
the guise of ‘anticipatory defence’ - but sought to make such use contingent upon a prior 
congressional grant of authority, through a formal war declaration allowing for nuclear force.  
To critics, the latest iteration of legislative inaction confirmed that Congress is serially 
guilty of constitutional nonfeasance: failing to do what it ought to under its Article One 
authority over initiating war. Although the Framers could not have anticipated nuclear 
weapons, the division of powers reflected their rejection of monarchical war-making. Thomas 
Jefferson, for instance, wrote to James Madison on 6 September 1789 that, ‘We have already 
given in example one effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of letting 
him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those 
who are to pay’ (Boyd, 1955, p. 397). But Congress has made no effort since 1945 to restrain 
the presidency letting loose the supremely dangerous dog of nuclear war.  
The human, economic and environmental costs of even ‘limited’ nuclear exchanges 
are generally recognised to be catastrophic. Since the decision to use nuclear weapons is so 
momentous and consequential, what explains the consistent refusal of Congress to restrict the 
ultimate presidential power of commencing a nuclear war? This article argues that the 
explanation is less about competing claims of constitutional authority (serious though these 
are) than three distinct but related influences accounting for Congress’s nonfeasance: the 
dysfunctionality of legislative intervention, congressional irresponsibility, and the relative 
costs of collective action, each of which is examined in turn. 
 
Nuclear War Powers 
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Responsibility for nuclear war epitomises the more general problem of democratic 
accountability and foreign policy like no other. Walzer (1992, p. 271) summarised mass 
acceptance of mutually assured destruction as making us all ‘hostages who lead normal 
lives.’ US lawmakers since 1945 have in effect acted as political hostages suffering nuclear 
Stockholm Syndrome, declining to restrain the ‘thermonuclear monarchy’ (Scarry, 2016) by 
(re)applying the constitutional balance of powers to nuclear decisions.  
The assumption of on-going international responsibilities by the US after 1945, 
growth of the national security state and permanent military, and development of nuclear 
weapons, vastly expanded presidential power (Wills, 2010). Although concern about the 
‘return’ of the ‘imperial presidency’ remains episodic, the institution has never truly gone 
away in the nuclear age (Rudalevige, 2005). Periodic reassertions of congressional 
prerogatives have mostly proven ineffective in restoring constitutional equipoise on matters 
of war and peace in general (Fisher, 2004), and nuclear war, in particular (Ellsberg, 2017).  
This is not to suggest that Congress is ineffective on influencing foreign and national 
security policy. Although some scholars document ‘decline’ on matters such as executive 
oversight (Fowler, 2015), others argue the legislature can and does exercise oversight, 
conduct investigations and bring to media and public attention important matters of national 
concern (Kriner & Schickler, 2016). Congress also, on occasion, defies presidential 
preferences and legislates more assertive measures, most notably on sanctions (Milner & 
Tingly, 2015). Moreover, multiple factors determine whether Congress adopts a supportive, 
strategic, competitive or disengaged orientation towards foreign policy (Carter & Scott, 
2012).  
Nonetheless, the growth of the security state has emphatically empowered the 
executive. Although explanations for presidents prevailing in the ‘invitation to struggle’ over 
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foreign affairs typically include presidential usurpation, congressional irresponsibility and 
judicial reluctance to adjudicate (Fisher, 2004, 2017a), these have been challenged. For 
example, Burns (2017) argued that rather than causing an erosion, presidents have responded 
to Congress’s reluctance to deliberate about military affairs. Partisan and ideological 
polarisation has also assisted presidents accruing greater power, with lawmakers reluctant to 
oppose presidents of their own party or place institutional prerogatives ahead of partisan 
imperatives (Howell & Pevehouse, 2007; Gries, 2013). Compared to the early Cold War era, 
polarisation has strongly solidified party bonds and militated against independent legislative 
behaviour. Policy substitution also accounts for presidents’ resort to militarised foreign policy 
options (Milner & Tingly, 2015).  
The cumulative result has been a path dependency with a steady equilibrium 
favouring the White House. When punctuated by major events – such as the 11 September 
2001 attacks – new equilibria typically resettle with enhanced executive authority. The brief 
reassertion of Congress during and after the Vietnam War was the exception that proved the 
rule. On issues of military intervention, especially, the congressional record has been one of 
active support for, or acquiescence in, what Fisher (2004) termed ‘presidential wars.’ 
Congress has not formally declared war since 1942 but it has either authorised presidential 
use of military force – often with broad and permissive resolutions, such as following 9/11 or 
in October 2002 on the Iraq War – or failed to halt unauthorised uses (over Haiti, Bosnia and 
Kosovo in the 1990s and Libya in 2011) (Hendrickson, 2015). 
The minimal discussion of nuclear war powers in the academic and policy literature 
therefore represents a curious lacuna (Raven-Hansen, 1987). Even the National War Powers 
Commission of 2008 – chaired by former Secretaries of States James Baker and Warren 
Christopher – issued a report that made no mention of nuclear war or nuclear weapons in 
seventy-two pages of analysis and recommendations (Miller Centre of Public Affairs, 2008). 
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Similarly, the overwhelming focus of scholarly attention has been either conventional war or, 
in relation to ‘future’ war, unmanned aerial vehicles and cyber-warfare (Jensen 2014), rather 
than the elemental matter of whether and when presidential decisions to go nuclear require 
congressional approval.  
Yet nuclear decision-making offers more an emblematic than exceptional expression 
of the broader war powers debate. Argument over the necessity for preventive or pre-emptive 
actions in the strategic sense of war (rather than low intensity operations) was opened by the 
development of nuclear weapons. As Moss (2008, p. 153) noted, ‘No longer could a president 
easily argue, as had Franklin D. Roosevelt on the morning of December 7 after seeing 
diplomatic cables suggesting an imminent Japanese attack, that the United States as a peace-
loving country could not attack Japan but would have to await an attack.’  
Trump’s ‘calculated ambiguity’ during the 115th Congress over North Korea’s nuclear 
programme provided a fitting coda to the confusing signals that Truman sent during the 
Korean War about nuclear weapons. At a White House press conference on November 30, 
1950, Truman confirmed that there had been active consideration but rejection of atomic 
bombs as ‘terrible weapons that should not be used on innocent men, women and children, 
who had nothing to do with military aggression.’ When he explained that the use of atomic 
bombs did not depend on UN authorisation and ‘the military commander in the field would 
have charge of the use of the weapons, as always’, the White House had subsequently to issue 
a statement affirming that the release of the weapons had not been authorised (Hickey, 1999, 
p. 112-3).  
 Presidents since Truman have exercised monopoly power over nuclear decisions 
despite the Constitution according exclusive authority to declare war to Congress (Raven-
Hansen, 1987). While the declaration clause was aimed at preventing offensive wars without 
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legislative consent, post-1950 presidents have initiated multiple undeclared wars and reserved 
nuclear decisions to the White House. Although Truman’s order to use the atomic bombs in 
Japan was arguably within the authority of the congressional war declaration that brought the 
US into World War Two, his successors contemplated first use without believing they 
required prior authorisation (as did Truman during the Korean War). Nixon, for example, did 
so during Vietnam (Ellsberg, 2017, p.309). The George H.W. Bush administration also 
threatened Saddam Hussein with nuclear retaliation if his forces used biological or chemical 
weapons against the US and its allies, prior to the Gulf War in 1991 (although Bush had 
privately ruled out use of nuclear forces in advance, ‘there was obviously no reason to inform 
the Iraqis of this’ [Baker, 1995, p. 359]). 
Practical decisions over nuclear war thus rest clearly with the president alone, as then 
Vice-President Dick Cheney attested: 
The President of the United States now for fifty years is followed at all times, twenty-
four hours a day, by a military aid carrying a football that contains the nuclear codes 
that he would use, and be authorised to use, in an event of a nuclear attack on the 
United States. He could launch the kind of devastating attack the world has never 
seen. He doesn’t have to check with anybody, he doesn’t have to call Congress, he 
doesn’t have to check with the courts (Wills, 2010, p. 4). 
Less clear is whether this inter-branch imbalance has reflected not a failure of the 
Constitution but congressional will. According to Henkin (1996), Congress possesses 
authority to restrict the president’s use of the armed forces through funding cut-offs (as 
occurred in 1973 in relation to Vietnam), prohibitions on foreign adventures (as occurred 
with the Boland Amendments from 1982-84 over policy toward Nicaragua), and establishing 
a legislative veto on presidential activity (though the exemplar, the War Powers Resolution, 
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remains mostly ineffectual). Outside national self-defence, where the president can 
legitimately use the armed forces without prior legislative assent, Congress can and should 
decide whether and when the nation will fight. Presidents have, however, strongly resisted 
‘micromanagement’ and recognised neither the constitutionality nor applicability of the War 
Powers Resolution, even as they regularly submit notifications to Congress about the use of 
US forces ‘consistent’ with if not ‘pursuant to’ its provisions. The courts have also refused to 
adjudicate war powers issues, declaring them a ‘non-justiciable’ or ‘political question’ for the 
elected branches to resolve. As Henkin (1996, p. 68) noted, ‘issues of War Power have 
become issues of conflict and cooperation in a “twilight zone” of uncertain or perhaps 
concurrent power.’ 
The ‘no first-use’ nuclear war legislation proposed in the 115th Congress occupies a 
especially murky constitutional twilight zone. Presidents would likely refuse to sign 
legislation restricting their authority, but lawmakers could overcome a veto through the 
required supermajorities. Presidential resistance notwithstanding, the constitutional issue 
turns on two related questions. Does restrictive legislation infringe the president’s Article II 
Commander-in-Chief authority? And is there a distinction between defensive and offensive 
nuclear war that parallels conventional wars, precluding prior restrictions on retaliation but 
permitting those on anticipatory defence?  
The 1787 convention changed the draft power of Congress to ‘make’ to ‘declare’ war, 
drawing a distinction between legislative (initiation and general rules) and executive 
(directive command of operations) functions. On nuclear matters, Congress has exercised its 
treaty power in refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 but approving 
New START in 2010. Its authorising and funding power was used under Bill Clinton to 
terminate funding for low-yield ‘mini-nukes’, for Safeguard C (a programme preserving the 
ability to conduct atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons), and for construction of a Ground 
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Wave Emergency Network of communication relay stations to be used in the event of nuclear 
war (Isaacs, 1994, p. 10). Congress also refused to fund research on a Robust Nuclear Earth 
Penetrator during the George W. Bush administration.  
Initiating war is formally for Congress but making war – including decisions on the 
means for its conduct – remains an executive function. Implicitly, by funding those nuclear 
weapons in the US arsenal and not restricting presidential autonomy on nuclear decisions, 
Congress has conceded that nuclear arms are another war-waging instrument available to the 
Commander-in-Chief. Can Congress therefore direct how the President exercises command 
by requiring or prohibiting certain military actions involving nukes?  
Scholarly opinion is deeply divided. ‘Congressionalists’ contend that, under Article I, 
Section VIII, Congress has complete power over the military. The President’s substantive 
command authority operates only where Congress has not provided specific direction 
(Prakash 2015). Congress can therefore prohibit use of nuclear arms without prior legislative 
permission, impose rules governing the circumstances wherein nuclear weapons are 
permissibly used, or decline purchase of weapons it does not wish made available. By 
contrast, ‘presidentialists’ (Yoo, 2005) argue that legislative restrictions on operational 
decisions infringe Article II: ‘[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual 
Service of the United States.’ 
Neither side, on balance, fully persuades. The Constitution does give Congress the 
power to ‘make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.’ 
Nothing requires these ‘rules’ to coincide with presidential preferences, though presidents can 
use their veto power to resist them. The power to declare war includes the power to establish 
wartime goals and limit a war’s scope (Henkin, 1996, p. 76). Enumeration of specific military 
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powers, however, does not imply that Congress has plenary directive authority over 
operations. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress possessed powers of ‘making rules 
for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and of directing their 
operations’ (emphasis added). Yet the Framers omitted the latter clause whilst retaining the 
former. This strongly implies that the power to ‘direct (military) operations’ is the president’s 
alone.  Since Congress possesses only specific powers, military matters not within these are 
necessarily the exclusive province of the Commander-in-Chief. Of these, the most prominent 
is ‘directing operations’, the power accorded Congress in the Articles but omitted in the 
Constitution. 
If so, in purely constitutional terms, the defensive versus offensive nuclear war 
division represents something of a distinction without a difference. While Congress could 
claim ‘no-first use’ means that the military has not been ‘called into the actual service’ of the 
US, and hence presidential operational autonomy is not encroached upon, this is problematic. 
US administrations – including the Obama administration - have rejected a declaratory ‘no 
first-use’ policy, partly because of the strategic role of first-use in deterrence as part of a 
putative escalation ladder. In this sense, legislative restrictions could infringe the directive 
operational authority of a president in a potential conflict, even if this was non-nuclear in 
character, by denying him full operational control of the US arsenal (including threats). 
Since its constitutionality is at minimum questionable, the case for restrictive 
legislation rests primarily on its merits as policy. Even if Cold War era strategic exigencies 
offered a compelling explanation for prior congressional inaction, however, the permissive 
approach to presidential nuclear decision-making since 1991 requires explanation. Or, as two 
proponents of reforming the launch process - to require the assent of the secretary of defence 
and attorney general - contended, ‘In the past, the enormous stakes of nuclear decision-
making were used to justify expanded presidential powers, but today, the better argument is 
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that the special challenges of nuclear decisions justify giving Congress some authority to 
regulate them’ (Betts and Waxman, 2018, 127). 
 
Explaining Non-Action by Congress 
As Griffith (2013) argues, the practice of how America goes to war – conventional, nuclear 
or covert - is as much a product of congressional deference as presidential usurpation. 
Nuclear war powers epitomise this phenomenon. The political incentive structures and risk-
reward balance facing lawmakers strongly disfavours congressional intervention. 
 
Congressional Dysfunctionality 
Although scholars have lamented the failure of Congress to enforce its constitutional 
authority, there are good reasons why it has proven unable to muster collective action. 
Congressional involvement in nuclear war decision-making would prove especially unwieldy 
and unwise, in three respects.  
First, implicit in the arguments for greater influence is the assumption that Congress 
can and would overcome the parochialism, hyper-partisanship and irresponsibility that critics 
identify as hallmarks of its contemporary dysfunction. Undoubtedly, much sniping at 
Congress is unfair. Many legislators are hard-working public servants, pursuing good public 
policy as well as re-election. That said, collective action in the public interest is not a 
legislative leitmotif. Many bemoan Congress as ‘broken’ and ‘failing America.’ To 
understate, it is difficult to envisage how ‘a supine, reactive body more eager to submit to 
presidential directives than to assert its own prerogatives’ (Mann and Ornstein, 2008, p. 16) 
would be fully repaired and functional on as consequential a matter as nuclear war.  
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From Truman to Reagan, instances of congressional deference to the executive branch 
owed much to intra-party divisions and Cold War geo-politics. But America’s separated 
system of government has encountered substantial problems in accommodating the partisan 
polarisation of recent decades (Mann and Ornstein 2012). Partisanship typically plays the 
major, if not entirely determinative, contribution in debates over authorising military action 
(Howell and Pevehouse, 2007). But this can often abet indecision as well as deference or 
obstruction. Perhaps the most graphic illustration is that neither a renewal nor replacement for 
the 9/11 Authorisation for the Use of Military Force has been enacted. In September 2017, 
the Senate voted down, by 61-36, a measure to amend the National Defence Authorisation 
Act to attach a six-month sunset to the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs and establish anew what war 
powers the presidency possessed to combat transnational terrorist groups (Carney, 2017). 
Second, the timing and content of statutory intervention has proven problematic. At 
what point should Congress optimally intervene in a developing nuclear threat? Like the 
legislatures of fellow nuclear democracies (the UK, France, India and Israel), Congress is 
constructed neither for active involvement in crisis situations nor tactical decision-making. 
These remain essentially, if not inherently, executive tasks. Deliberation may be an activity at 
which it excels, but subtlety, secrecy and dispatch are not reliable attributes of congressional 
behaviour. For lawmakers to undertake action in the middle of a tense international 
confrontation could hinder rather than help the president’s diplomatic hand. For the 
legislature to intervene outside crisis conditions, however, might be counter-productive, 
helping to precipitate a crisis it intended to postpone by signalling potential US aggression or 
failing to anticipate important contingencies in the permissible uses of nuclear weaponry for 
which it legislated.  
In neither case is it clearly apparent exactly what ‘added value’ would accrue in 
securing the national interest. A ‘seat-of-the-pants’ crisis provision would, probably, be 
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epiphenomenal to where the action really was in terms of high level negotiations, whether 
direct or (as in the Cuban Missile Crisis) through back-channels. A ‘blank cheque’ provision, 
permissive and permanent, would make minimal difference to the president’s autonomy, 
beyond giving it a congressional imprimatur in perpetuity (absent stipulated cut-off dates).  
 Third, exactly what Congress would be authorising would be a matter for lawmakers. 
But similar problems arise on a potential authorisation for using nuclear arms as those 
Congress has confronted – or declined to confront - on conventional warfare. Either the 
authorisation is so broad as to admit of almost any contingency (the criticism commonly 
levelled at the post-9/11 AUMF) - in which case its restrictive qualities are mostly fictional - 
or it prescribes so many conditions as to leave the president and Pentagon hamstrung, lacking 
the necessary or desirable discretion to threaten or execute optimal policies.  
The proposed ‘no first-use’ legislation is especially problematic, as it requires a war 
declaration. Unless Congress is able and willing to alter its practice of (sometimes) 
authorising military action and rediscover the ‘lost art of declaring war’ (Hallett, 1998), the 
president would theoretically be unable to make first use of nuclear weapons at all. In the 
event of, for example, ‘hybrid war’ by Moscow against a Baltic state, a NATO military 
response is unlikely to warrant a formal US declaration of war on Russia. Similarly, a North 
Korean strike against South Korea or Japan would invite a US military response, but not a 
war declaration. It is therefore unclear whether the real intention of proponents of restrictive 
legislation is to prohibit presidential discretion over offensive nuclear war completely – a ‘no 
first-use’ policy by stealth – or ‘merely’ to subject this to legislative approval.  
 
Legislative Irresponsibility 
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A second explanation of congressional refusal to assert its prerogatives is irresponsibility (or 
blame avoidance). Lawmakers have only reluctantly assumed co-responsibility for military 
action abroad that may entail large-scale losses of US personnel. The institutional 
competence of Congress for informed judgment forms a corollary aspect.  
To the extent that the appeal of congressional restrictions rests on the desire for 
independent judgment, the evidence of independence is modest. While mistakes from the 
Iranian revolution to the Iraq War demonstrate that the executive is not immune from making 
faulty judgements based on intelligence, its stock of information remains immeasurably 
greater. Moreover, congressional staff lack confidence in the institutional capacity of the 
legislature to do its job. Facing more informational and policy demands, a combination of 
staff reductions, turnover, modest compensation, and lagging technological infrastructure has 
limited responsiveness. Only six per cent of senior aides were “very satisfied” that “Members 
have adequate time and resources to understand, consider and deliberate policy and 
legislation” (CMF 2017). When it comes to exercising effective oversight on military action, 
it may not be too cynical to suggest that lawmakers have irresponsibly avoided asserting their 
institutional prerogatives because they have not wished to pay for the rope that hangs them 
(Mann & Ornstein, 2006). 
Partisan imperatives again overlay institutional ones. With the atrophy of the 
ideological centre, unrelenting partisanship undercuts what confidence may be ventured 
about dispassionate legislators defying their president (or supporting a president of the other 
party) on matters of nuclear war. In an era of heightened partisan competition, closely 
contested elections and ‘insecure majorities’ (Lee, 2016), lawmakers of one party have rarely 
been willing to place the institutional integrity of Congress above their partisan imperatives. 
Democrats may wish to limit the nuclear discretion of a Republican, but not a Democratic, 
president, and vice versa. 
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If, on the other hand, reasserting congressional authority is premised less on 
independence than on lawmakers’ credentials as delegates faithfully reflecting their 
constituents’ will, the decisional problem is relocated to the public. Proponents of 
congressional restrictions seem to believe that presidential adventurism would be constrained 
by a reluctant or war-weary public. But there exists limited evidence that the public (as 
opposed to ‘attentive publics’) actively influences decision-makers, other than setting the 
broadest parameters for action on foreign policy and the priority it should be accorded. As 
Mandelbaum (2016, 81) noted, ‘Foreign policy is to public policy in general what foreign 
films are to Hollywood extravaganzas: a minority interest.’ 
Moreover, the logic of a restraining public is triply problematic in terms of empirical 
support.  
First, the dovish qualities of the American public are unclear. Mass attitudes on 
nuclear war have proven complex. For example, in 2002, a Washington Post-ABC News Poll 
found that six in ten Americans favoured a nuclear response acceptable ‘if Hussein orders use 
of chemical or biological weapons on US troops’ (Morin, 2002). An August 2016 poll found 
that while 17 per cent of Americans believed the US should never use nuclear weapons in any 
circumstances, 50 per cent believed they should only be used in response to an attack on 
America, 18 per cent favoured using them in some circumstances where the US has not 
suffered an attack, and 16 per cent were unsure (YouGov, 2016).  
Second, the direction of the causal links on military matters is somewhat opaque. 
Opinion is divided over whether Americans are fatality-, casualty-, or defeat-phobic, and 
whether mass responses to military intervention are more to events (Gelpi, Feaver & Reifler, 
2009) or elite cues (Berinsky, 2009). On the latter reading, the causal chain runs more from 
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elites to the public than vice versa: when partisan elites are broadly united, the public follows 
suit; when the political class is divided, it also splits along partisan lines.  
Third, whatever the proximate source, the public’s perceived sensitivity to military 
losses has affected recent US policies, from weaponizing economic and financial sanctions to 
greater use of drones (Milner & Tingley, 2015). But public sensitivity is predominantly to 
US, not non-American, losses. Replaying the 1945 example of a Truman-esque trade-off 
between using nuclear weapons on an enemy and causing mass civilian deaths or losing 
substantial numbers of US troops in a conventional war, recent work – applying the trade-off 
to a hypothetical case involving Iran - showed most Americans preferring the nuclear option. 
‘Today, as in 1945, the US public is unlikely to serve as a serious constraint on any president 
who might consider using nuclear weapons in the crucible of war,’ Sagan and Valentino 
(2017, p. 79) concluded. Relying on Congress as an instrument of the popular will may ratify 
rather than restrain presidential action.  
 
Relative Costs 
International diplomacy is invariably a ‘two-level’ game (Putnam, 1988). As such, 
five potential costs attend whatever benefits might accompany an enhanced congressional 
role on nuclear decisions, tilting the risk-reward balance against legislative intervention.  
First, there are powerful reasons why no president has ruled out first-use of the 
nuclear arsenal. However much the international strategic deck may appear stacked against 
him, a president exercising unfettered decisional discretion has a powerful card in the 
highest-stakes international poker, not least the ability to bluff and threaten. For diplomacy to 
be contingent on congressional legislation could compromise Washington’s hand. Successive 
administrations have taken to heart George F. Kennan’s advice to students at the National 
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War College in 1946: ‘You have no idea how much it contributes to the general politeness 
and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed force in the background.’ 
 Second, Trump’s ‘belligerent minimalism’ (Lynch 2016) has confirmed a widespread 
assumption of presidents’ hawkishness. But Congress does not always place presidential dogs 
of war on short legislative leashes. After 9/11, for example, Congress was – initially – 
strongly supportive of the Bush administration’s assertive response. Previously, presidents 
(Truman during the Korean War, Eisenhower from 1953-61, and JFK in 1962) acted as 
moderating forces upon more belligerent actors from the National Security Council and 
uniformed military to Congress. For example, during the only consultation with Congress to 
occur during the Cuban Missile Crisis, its members were more bellicose than Kennedy 
(Fursenko & Naftali, 1997, pp. 244-5). While, in discharging its constitutional duties, 
Congress has often been feckless, the historical record belies stereotyping all presidents as 
reckless. Presidential discretion allows consideration of options that a collective process 
might otherwise dismiss as politically prohibitive. 
 Third, co-decision-making risks the possibility of a constitutional crisis arising to 
exacerbate a national security showdown. In the event of a deadlocked Congress, what 
guidance should a judicious and responsible president follow – especially where his national 
security principals were unanimously in concurrence on the imperative for nuclear force? The 
domestic crisis would be even greater were the congressional margins of approval to be 
narrow – to allow or disallow first-use – or, especially, where the two legislative chambers 
disagreed with one another. In this, one could imagine something like the 1991 vote to 
authorise military action in the Gulf when, had a mere three votes in the Senate switched 
sides, the Senate would have refused authorisation that the House approved.  
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Fourth, but related, is how desirable it would be to see a key matter of national 
security being played out in public, to a fragmented press and irresponsible social media. 
Whatever benefits might accrue to international perceptions of the majesty of US democracy 
could well be outweighed by the delays and signals that acrimonious deliberation could send. 
If a greater role for Congress is provided, there also exists a risk that US foes may act on 
misguided assumptions or irrational calculations. An enemy might well take false succour 
from an abrasive and divisive debate that suggested hesitancy at the highest levels about 
using force. Such a debate could incentivise a desperate, collapsing or miscalculating regime 
to advance precipitate military and other actions that it wrongly considered safe from 
retribution: the classic ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ proposition.  
 A fifth, final, and perhaps decisive consideration is whether congressional restriction 
of presidential unilateralism, while admirable from a democratic viewpoint, is otiose from a 
functional one. That is, faced with a security crisis of such magnitude that first-use was 
seriously contemplated, how far would a president feel fatally constrained by the absence of 
congressional permission? Might such a president echo the claim of George H.W. Bush in 
1992, looking back on Desert Storm and contrasting its success to domestic policy stasis by 
explaining that, ‘I didn't have to get permission from some old goat in the United States 
Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait’ (Bush, 1992)? If the primary purpose of 
legal constraints is to raise the political price paid for their violation, this is - however 
improbable – not impossible. A country against which a US president felt it necessary to 
contemplate using nuclear weapons would typically have appeared on the public’s radar long 
in advance. In the handful of nations against which it is remotely possible to imagine such a 
strike occurring – North Korea, Iran, Russia, China and Pakistan - these countries invariably 
register low in ‘thermometer’ ratings of American affections (Norman, 2016). Added to 
which, any situation in which the use of such weapons was possible would have arisen 
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against a dedicated White House campaign to set the preparatory groundwork for action. 
Shocking as the use might be, it would likely not come as a shock. 
 Under such conditions, presidents could plausibly relegate the prospect of 
impeachment or removal under the 25
th
 Amendment to a second or third-order concern 
(assuming the president and the US survive, that is). It is highly unlikely that a measure taken 
in good faith by the Commander-in-Chief on national security grounds would meet with 
overwhelming public disapproval. Although, if a president breached a ‘no first-use’ law, he 
would have violated his constitutional oath ‘to take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ 
it is not prima facie clear that impeachment would result. The core concept informing ‘high 
crimes and misdemeanours’ is abuse of political power in violation of the best interests of the 
nation. Politically, it would be unlikely in such a polarised era that a party could easily secure 
a majority in the House for impeachment and a two-thirds supermajority in the Senate to 
convict under such post-conflict conditions. In short, presidents using nuclear weapons in a 
first-strike capacity may have little to fear politically for the consequences of even illegal 
actions. As JFK worried in 1962, the greater concern over impeachment could conceivably 
stem not from excess presidential zeal for military action but excess caution: failing to act 
assertively in the face of a crisis demanding resolution. As such, lawmakers may have been – 
and remain - understandably reluctant to expend substantial or valuable political capital 
seeking the Pyrrhic victory of restrictive but risk-laden legislation that presidents would 
likely anyway ignore. 
 
Conclusion 
Strong concern for the limits of human reason, virtue and wisdom led the Framers to place a 
high premium on checks and balances in the US Constitution. It is therefore mildly ironic 
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that, after decades of mostly failing to restrain presidential war powers in major, protracted 
and low-intensity conventional conflicts, Congress should turn its attentions to nuclear war. 
Although critics of presidential wars may lament the constitutional imbalance that has arisen, 
from the ‘police action’ in Korea in 1950 to the ‘war on terror’ today (Fisher, 2017b), as 
Justice Jackson cautioned in The Steel Seizure Cases (Youngstown, 1952), ‘[O]nly Congress 
itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.’  
Despite the anomaly of the ultimate presidential power being subject to minimal 
checks or balances, legislative deficiencies augur badly for a positive congressional 
contribution to nuclear war decision-making. There exists no means that is simultaneously 
constitutional and practical by which Congress can productively share co-decisional authority 
with presidents and become a ‘net provider’ of US nuclear security. The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in November 2017 took no further action on changing the nuclear 
launch procedures in part because expert testimony rejected legislative restrictions on the 
president’s nuclear-weapons authority, deeming it impossible to craft legislation that could 
constitutionally limit the president’s power to launch a first strike without also limiting the 
deterrent effect of the US nuclear arsenal (US Senate 2017).  
 Whatever the problems surrounding presidential discretion, the reasons for 
congressional nonfeasance remain stubbornly intractable. Process cannot be divorced from 
policy. Although there are good reasons to oppose first-use, ethically (avoiding a sneak 
‘nuclear Pearl Harbour’) and practically (conventional weaponry can now eliminate many of 
the targets that nuclear weapons are designed to destroy), no administration has been willing 
to do so. Requiring congressional checks on first use would be a hedge against a ‘low-risk, 
high-impact’ event: an impetuous president ordering offensive nuclear war. But ‘no first-use’ 
legislation is ultimately neither sufficient nor necessary to preclude preventive nuclear war. 
The only completely reliable and durable solution to the problem purposeful or accidental 
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nuclear catastrophe is for the nine nuclear powers to eliminate the weapons. But in the new 
poly-nuclear era of increasing geo-political conflict, that prospect – however desirable – is 
remote. While efforts to address the political factors sustaining nuclear weapons are 
necessary, these cannot occlude the need for maintaining effective deterrence and reassurance 
mechanisms in the meantime (Roberts, 2016). Although the ‘Doomsday Clock’ ticked even 
closer to midnight after January 2017, the hour for ‘no first-use’ legislation has not yet 
arrived.  
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